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Abstract 
I study the impact of beating analysts’ forecasts and the impact of analysts’ forecast 
dispersion on the pricing of firms’ credit default swaps (CDSs). CDS premium is the 
compensation required by investors for bearing firms’ credit default risk. Sell-side analysts 
collect and combine market, industry and firm information to produce stock 
recommendations, stock price targets and accounting number forecasts. The information 
contained in their forecasts may provide additional information to investors to price CDSs. 
My results show that firms that beat analysts’ earnings and revenue forecasts, and firms 
with less dispersed analysts’ earnings and revenue forecasts have on average reduced CDS 
premia around the earnings announcement date. These effects are stronger for firm that 
jointly beat the two forecasts and for firms with high risk of default. The effect of beating 
analysts’ earnings (revenue) forecasts is stronger for firms with more (less) earnings 
quality.  
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Beating market expectations, analysts’ forecasts dispersion 
and the pricing of credit default swaps 
1. Introduction 
 I explore the impact of meeting/beating analysts’ earnings and revenue forecasts on 
firms’ Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) and the effect of analysts’ forecast dispersion on 
perceptions regarding firm credit default risk. A CDS is the most commonly utilized type of 
credit derivative in the market. Similar to an insurance contract, a CDS is a bilateral 
contract of protection between the buyer and seller that provides the buyer protection 
against credit default risks. Unlike the firm’s cost of debt, which is a function of the firm’s 
probability of default, the recovery risk and differences in contractual agreements, CDSs 
provide a “clean” measure of the value of firm’s default risk because it is the compensation 
required by market participants if they are to bear that specific risk. Moreover, CDS spreads 
tend to respond more quickly to credit conditions in the short term (Zhu 2006).
1
 As a result, 
CDSs provide a specific measure that allows one to test the impact of beating analysts’ 
forecasts and analysts’ forecast dispersion on the pricing of firms’ probability of default. 
 Several models have been developed to study the pricing of CDSs. My study relies 
on hybrid models (Duffie and Lando 2001) that assume that expected future cash flow and 
thus the probability of default depend partially on firms’ future asset value and capital 
structure. Because these variables are not observable a priori, investors might rely on a 
firm’s periodic accounting information (Das et al. 2009, Callen et al. 2009) and on the 
                                               
1 Further details about CDS contracts are presented in the next section. 
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communications of other market participants, such as credit rating agencies (Hull et al. 
2004, Daniels and Jensen 2005) and sell-side analysts, to value firms’ credit default risk. 
Because financial analysts are information intermediaries with a relative advantage in 
processing and disseminating firm, industry and market information, meeting or exceeding 
their expectations (in the form of analysts’ earnings and revenue forecasts) provides 
additional information about future firm performance and therefore help investors to price 
firms’ CDSs. In addition, previous literature finds that an increase in investors’ 
expectations about firms’ profitability (e.g., firms that beat analysts’ earnings and revenues 
forecasts) results in an increase in the firms’ equity value and in a decrease in the firms’ 
probability of default (Black and Scholes, 1973 and Merton, 1974). As a result, I expect 
that meeting/beating analysts’ expectations has an impact on firms’ CDSs.  
 Several papers have documented the impact of analysts’ forecast dispersion on the 
equity and bond markets (Chen and Subramanyam 2008, Mansi et al. 2010).
2
 The 
information contained in analysts’ forecasts may reduce information asymmetry between 
the market and the firm, helping investors to price securities. Thus, the information 
contained in analysts’ earnings and revenues forecast dispersion might have an impact on 
the price of a firm’s credit default risk. 
 Based on a sample of 56,775 observations (480 unique firms) from the Fitch 
database from 2002 to 2009, my results show that after controlling for structural factors 
(Merton 1974), accounting information, credit ratings scores and cumulative abnormal 
returns, firms that meet/beat analysts’ quarterly earnings and/or revenues forecasts show, 
on average, a reduction in their CDS premia around the earnings announcement date. I find 
                                               
2 Mansi et al. (2010) study the impact of analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy, dispersion and revision 
volatility on firms’ cost of debt. These authors find that analysts’ forecast dispersion is the most important 
attribute.  
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that the effects of exceeding analysts’ forecasts on firms’ CDS premia are stronger for firms 
with a high risk of default and for firms that jointly beat analysts’ earnings and revenue 
forecasts. In addition, beating analysts’ quarterly earnings (revenues) forecasts has an 
impact on CDS premia only for firms with high (low) levels of earnings quality and for 
firms reporting profits (losses). I also find that the effect of beating analysts’ forecasts on 
the CDS Premium is stronger during the financial crisis period. 
 I also document a significant association between analysts’ forecast dispersion and 
the pricing of CDSs. Specifically, firms with less dispersed analyst earnings and revenues 
forecasts tend to present a reduction in their CDS premia around the earnings 
announcement date. My results indicate that less uncertainty about firms’ future 
performance, as proxied by the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, are priced into firms’ 
credit default risk. 
 In recent years, CDSs have dramatically increased in popularity, rising from $180 
billion in 1996 to over $54.6 trillion in the second quarter of 2008.
3
 This amount represents 
over two times the size of the U.S. stock market according to the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA). The rapid development and lax regulation of the CDS 
market have been implicated as some of the causes behind the recent financial crisis, 
raising a number of policy concerns about market stability. Given the amount of resources 
allocated in the economy in the form of CDSs and the composition of most investor 
portfolios, studying the determinants of CDS pricing has become an important task in 
recent years. Moreover, previous literature has studied the impact of sell-side analysts’ 
forecasts on the equity and bond market. My paper attempts to provide evidence on the 
impact of the information provided by this important group of market participants on 
                                               
3 http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/ISDA-Market-Survey-historical-data.pdf 
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perceptions regarding firms’ credit default risk and on how earnings quality affects the 
impact of beating market expectations. 
 Previous studies document that a firm’s cost of debt responds to beating analysts’ 
earnings forecasts and to the amount of dispersion in those forecasts (Jiang 2008, Mansi et 
al. 2010). My paper extends this literature in two important ways. First, by focusing on 
CDS pricing rather than on the cost of debt of firms, I am able to isolate the impact of 
beating analysts’ forecasts on the market’s perception of a firm’s probability of default. The 
reason for this analysis is that a firm’s cost of debt prices not only the firm’s probability of 
default but also the debtholders’ recovery risk.4 Second, I provide evidence that beating 
analysts’ forecasts (earnings and revenue forecasts) and not only earnings forecasts are 
associated with declines in the market’s perception of a firm’s probability of default. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes some characteristics of CDS 
contracts. This section also reviews the literature about the impact of analysts’ forecasts on 
the equity and debt market, the models developed to estimate the price of CDSs and the 
impact of accounting information on the CDS market. In this section, I develop the main 
hypothesis. Section 3 presents the research design and the sample selection procedure. 
Section 4 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation coefficients among the main 
                                               
4 The importance of being able to isolate the effect on the market’s perception of a firm’s default risk is most 
easily seen by trying to control for the debtholders’ recovery risk when examining the impact of exceeding 
analysts’ forecasts on the firm’s cost of debt.  To perform this analysis, I compute the ratio of the firm’s total 
debt to property, plant and equipment each year and use it as a proxy for recovery risk—those with small 
(large) values are those with lower (higher) levels of recovery risk.  Replacing the log of the firm’s CDS price 
at the end of the quarter with the log of the firm’s initial bond yield at the end of the quarter as the 
independent variable and running the regressions separately for those firms in the top and bottom terciles as 
ranked by the ratio of total debt to PPE provide evidence of the value of isolating default risk from recovery 
risk.  In particular, beating analysts’ forecasts is not associated with a firm’s cost of debt when the firm’s 
recovery risk is high.  Furthermore, while the association between analysts’ forecasts and a firm’s cost of debt 
is similar to their association to the price of CDS on the firm’s debt, the relation is significantly weaker.  
Because the ratio of total debt to PPE is merely a proxy for recovery risk, these results show the value of 
focusing specifically on a pure measure of the market’s pricing of the firm’s default risk.  
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variables used in this study. Section 5 presents the multivariate analysis and describes the 
main results. Section 6 shows some additional analysis and section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses development 
2.1 Credit Default Swaps 
 Credit default swaps (CDSs) are financial instruments that serve to protect against a 
default on a particular bond or security. CDSs are a bilateral contract between the buyer and 
the seller of protection where the buyer of a CDS, who is not required to but often owns the 
underlying credit asset, pays a periodic, quarterly or annual, fee or premium to the seller. 
The CDS spreads are the annualized premium rate quoted as a percentage of the notional 
value of the underlying debt. The seller agrees to pay the buyer a set amount if there is a 
credit event, such as bankruptcy, failure to pay, and restructuring. Once the specified credit-
related event, such as the insolvency of an underlying corporate entity, occurs, a ‘Credit 
Event Notice’ is delivered either by the buyer or seller. Usually, the settlement conditions 
for the default payments of CDS are established at the time of writing the relevant CDS 
contract. These conditions typically take the form of physical or cash settlements. If a 
physical settlement is agreed upon, the protection buyer has to deliver the underlying bond 
in exchange for compensation. If a cash settlement is agreed upon, the protection buyer 
receives the difference between the bond value at the time of settlement and the bond’s 
nominal value in cash. CDS contracts are usually traded in maturities from 6 months to 30 
years.  
 In contrast to other types of derivatives, such as interest rate swaps, but similar to 
options, the risks assumed in a CDS by the protection buyer and protection seller are not 
symmetrical. The protection buyer effectively takes on a short position in the credit risk of 
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the reference entity, which thereby relieves the buyer from exposure to default. The 
protection seller, in contrast, takes on a long position in the credit risk of the reference 
entity, which is essentially the same as the default risk taken on when lending directly to 
the reference entity.  
 The motivation for this paper comes from two sources within the literature: i) the 
impact of beating/meeting analysts’ expectations on investors’ perceptions about firm 
performance and the effect of analysts’ forecasts on capital markets and ii) the impact of 
accounting information on perceptions regarding firms’ credit default risk.  
2.2 The effects of beating analysts’ forecasts and the properties of analysts’ forecasts for 
capital markets 
 Previous literature provides evidence that investors, boards of directors, and 
creditors use analysts’ forecasts as points of reference in evaluating firms’ future 
performance. Accordingly, meeting/beating analysts’ earnings and revenue forecasts have 
an important impact on firm stock prices and on the cost of debt (Bartov et al. 2005, Brown 
and Caylor 2005, Rees and Sivaramakrishnan 2007, Ertimur et al. 2003, Ertimur et al. 
2009).  
 Providing evidence of the impact of meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts on equity 
returns, Brown and Caylor (2005) and Bartov et al. (2005) find that after controlling for 
earnings forecast errors, firms that beat current analysts’ earnings expectations enjoy a 
higher return than firms that fail to meet such expectations. These authors also find that 
avoiding negative quarterly earnings surprises has become the most important reference 
point in recent years and has become more important than meeting zero earnings or 
earnings numbers for previous years. Because earnings are the most important metric used 
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to evaluate firms’ future performance (Graham et al. 2005), firms that beat analysts’ 
earnings forecasts may provide useful information that helps to determine firm credit 
default risk. 
 The literature also provides evidence on the value relevance of analysts’ revenues 
forecasts. Rees and Sivaramakrishnan (2007) find that the revenue response coefficient is 
statistically significant after controlling for the magnitude of the earnings surprise. These 
researchers conclude that revenues provide incremental information to the market about 
firm value. Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006) find that meeting analysts’ revenues forecasts 
predicts more persistent future earnings growth. After controlling for past earnings 
surprises, earnings growth is positively related to past revenue surprises. Therefore, when a 
firm reports accounting numbers, investors may obtain valuable information if they can 
determine whether the earnings surprise is driven by changes in revenues or by changes in 
expenses. 
Recent evidence has also shown that beating analysts’ earnings forecasts impacts 
firms’ cost of debt. Jiang (2008) reports that debt holders and credit rating agencies appear 
to use earnings benchmarks to evaluate firm solvency. He finds that firms that report profits 
and beat analysts’ earnings forecasts have lower initial bond yield spreads in the next 
period year and a lower initial bond yield between consecutive periods. Moreover, he finds 
that firms that beat earnings forecasts have a higher probability of a credit rating upgrade in 
the next year. 
Overall, the literature provides evidence that beating analysts’ forecasts affects 
firms’ equity valuation and perceptions regarding the firms’ repayment capacity. Therefore, 
when firms meet or beat market earnings and/or revenues expectations, this event may 
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provide additional information to investors, helping them to evaluate the firms’ future 
performance and to adjust their valuations of the firms’ credit default risk accordingly.5  
2.3 The impact of accounting information on the firm’s credit risk  
 Several papers have studied the impact of earnings numbers on the bond markets. 
Ziebart and Reiter (1992) show that a higher return on assets (ROA) is associated with low 
bond yield spreads. Datta and Dhillon (1993) find that bondholders appear to react 
positively to unexpected earnings increases. Furthermore, bond and stock price responses to 
unexpected earnings announcements are symmetric. Easton et al. (2009) find that 
accounting information is value relevant in the bond market. Specifically, these researchers 
show that bond trading increases around earnings announcement dates and that bond return 
reactions around earnings announcement dates are positively related to changes in earnings 
and to analysts’ forecasts errors. Moreover, they document an asymmetrical association 
between bad and good news in the bond market. Bond returns react more strongly to 
negative earnings surprises than positive earnings surprises. Overall, these papers provide 
evidence of the value relevance of accounting information, especially earnings information, 
in pricing firms’ credit default risk, capacity for debt repayment and recovery.  
 As discussed in detail by Callen et al. (2009), the literature provides three types of 
models for studying the valuation of CDSs: structural models, reduced form models and 
hybrid models. The recent accounting and finance literature has focused on empirically 
testing the different models proposed to explain the pricing of credit derivatives. Ericsson et 
                                               
5 The view of analysts as sophisticated information intermediaries has been challenged by recent studies that 
find that analysts do not use all of the information in past earnings, changes in earnings, and working capital 
accruals and that they face some incentives to bias their forecasts (Abarbanell and Bushee 1997 and Bradshaw 
et al. 2001). In a recent paper, Bradshaw et al. (2010) find that for longer forecasts horizons and for small and 
young firms, a simple random-walk forecast model performs better than analysts’ forecasts in predicting 
future EPS.    
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al. (2009) find that the theoretical (structural) determinants of a credit event modeled by 
Merton (1974), including the amount of leverage incurred by the underlying firm, the 
volatility of the underlying assets and the riskless spot rate, explain a large portion of the 
variance in the valuation of firms’ credit default risk premia. Other studies build on the 
hybrid model developed by Duffie and Lando (2001) and incorporate accounting and other 
market information in the CDS valuation models. Hybrid models of CDS pricing assume 
that the expected future cash flows (and, therefore, the probability of default) depend on the 
variables defined in the structural models, imperfect information about firms’ asset value 
and capital structure and uncertainty regarding firms’ future value. Because these variables 
are not directly observable, investors might rely on firms’ accounting information and on 
the analysis of other market participants (e.g., credit rating agencies and sell-side analysts) 
in determining firm credit risk. Seeking evidence of the association between CDS and 
credit ratings, Daniels and Jensen (2005) and Hull et al. (2004) find that CDS spreads and 
bond spreads change at the time of a credit rating downgrade and that the market seems to 
anticipate changes in credit rating scores. Some papers examine the impact of accounting 
information on CDS pricing. Das et al. (2009) compare accounting-based and market-based 
valuation models for the period 2001-2005 and find that a credit risk valuation model 
entirely composed of accounting metrics performs comparably to market-based structural 
models
6
. In a related study, Callen et al. (2009) find that accounting information affects 
CDS price. Specifically, these authors find that quarterly earnings numbers and both of 
their components (accruals and cash flow) positively impact the levels and changes of 
                                               
6
 Das et al. (2009) use 10 variables to proxy for firm size, profitability, financial liquidity, trading account 
activity, sales growth and capital structure. 
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firms’ CDS premia in the next period and between consecutive periods.7 In addition, in an 
event study analysis, these researchers find that earnings surprises affect the perception of 
firm credit default risk around the earnings announcement date. My paper also provides 
evidence on the impact of meeting analysts’ revenues forecasts on the pricing of CDSs and 
on how earnings quality affects the impact of meeting earnings and revenue forecasts on the 
perceptions of firms’ credit default risk. 
 I base my analysis on the empirical implications of the hybrid models. Because 
financial analysts are information intermediaries who have a relative advantage in 
processing firm, industry and market information, firms that beat their expectations (in 
terms of analysts’ earnings and revenue forecasts) may indicate relevant information about  
their future performance and their asset dynamics and thus help investors in updating their 
valuations of CDSs. Because standard asset pricing theories predict that an increase in 
investors’ expectations about future firms’ value results in the perceived probability of 
default, I expect a decrease in the premium that firms pay for credit risk protection for firms 
that beat analysts’ expectations. On the other hand, since the major players in the credit 
market are institutional investors, if analysts’ forecasts contain little information about firm 
probability of default, the credit markets would ignore them. In addition, managers face 
incentives to meet analysts’ forecasts; if this is the case meeting these forecasts would not 
provide relevant information to price credit default swaps. 
                                               
7 Because their main analysis focuses on the effect of accounting numbers on CDS prices, Callen et al. (2009) 
measure the level of CDS premium as the log of the CDS premium one day after the SEC filing date and 
compute the change in the CDS premium from one day after the quarter t SEC filing date to one day after the 
quarter t+1 SEC filing date.  
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Hypothesis 1. Firms that meet or beat analysts’ earnings or revenue expectations 
have, on average, a reduction in their CDS premia around the earnings 
announcement date. 
 The role of accounting information is particularly important at shorter maturities 
(Duffie and Lando (2001)). Consequently, I expect the impact of meeting/beating analysts’ 
forecasts be more pronounced at shorter maturities. 
 As argued by Mansi et al. (2010), the information contained in analysts’ forecasts 
(especially forecast dispersion) impacts perceptions regarding firms’ future performance. 
These authors find that less forecast dispersion and less revision volatility are negatively 
related to firms’ cost of debt. If analysts disagree about the future accounting information 
of a firm to a lesser degree, there will likely be less uncertainty about the firm’s future 
performance, and therefore, a reduced premium may need to be paid for default risk 
protection.  
Hypothesis 2. Firms for which analysts’ earnings and revenue forecasts have less 
dispersion have, on average, lower CDS premia around the earnings announcement 
date. 
 If earnings surprises are accompanied by revenue surprises in the same direction, 
the earnings surprises are likely to be driven by revenue growth rather than by a reduction 
in expenses (or by increases in net margins). This situation might provide useful 
information about a firm’s future ability to grow and therefore reduce the firm’s perceived 
probability of a default.  
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Hypothesis 3. Firms that jointly beat analysts’ earnings and revenue forecasts have 
a stronger impact on the pricing of CDSs. 
 When earnings are more informative about firms’ performance, investors may place 
a greater emphasis on earnings information. Therefore, I hypothesize that the effect of 
beating analysts’ earnings forecasts on the pricing of firms’ credit default risk is more 
pronounced for firms with more earnings quality.
8
 
Hypothesis 4. The effect of beating analysts’ earnings expectations compared to the 
effect of beating analysts’ revenue forecasts on the pricing of CDS premia is more 
pronounced for firms with higher earnings quality. 
 Previous studies indicate that there is a stronger effect of earnings benchmark 
beating for high default risk firms (Jiang, 2008, DeFond and Zhang, 2008). As a result, 
meeting earnings and revenues forecasts is likely more important when there is a high risk 
of insolvency. 
 Hypothesis 5. The effect of beating analysts’ earnings and revenue forecasts on the 
 pricing of CDS premia is more pronounced for firms with high default risk. 
3. Research Design 
 Following previous studies, I use a regression approach to model the determinants 
of CDS prices (e.g., Abid and Naifar 2006 and Callen et al. 2009). The main analysis 
involves cross-sectional regressions of changes on firms’ CDS premia around the earnings 
                                               
8 I measure a firm’s earnings quality by calculating the firm’s historic accrual quality.  
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announcement date on dummy variables indicating firms that meet/beat analysts’ forecasts, 
analyst forecast dispersion measures and other control variables.  
 To test whether the dispersion of analysts’ quarterly forecasts and beating analysts’ 
quarterly earnings and revenue forecast affect the value of CDS premia when earnings 
numbers are reported, I estimate the coefficients of the following model
9
: 
CDS_Changei,t = β1+ β2Levi,t+ β3Sizei,t+ β4StdReti,t+ β5Yieldt+ β6SPi,t + β7 CARi,t  
  +β8EarnSurpi,t +β9RevSurpi,t +β10 BeatEarni,t +β11 BeatRevi,t           (1) 
  + β12DispersionEarni,t + β13DispersionRevi,t+ β14Mati,t + β15Seniori,t  
  + β16Liqi,t + β17Year_dummies + εi,t 
 The dependent variable is the change of the CDS premium from one day before to 
one day after the quarterly earnings announcement date. To test my first hypothesis, I 
include the following independent variables: i) BeatEarni,t, which takes the value of 1 if the 
firm meets or beats the analysts’ quarterly earnings forecast consensus in quarter t and 0 
otherwise; and ii) BeatRevi,t, which is set equal to 1 if the firm meets or beats the analysts’ 
quarterly revenue forecast consensus in quarter t and 0 otherwise.
 10
 My first hypothesis 
predicts that the coefficients of these two variables will be negative and statistically 
significant. To test my second hypothesis, I include the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts in 
the model. I define the dispersion of analysts’ earnings and revenue forecasts as the 
negative value of the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings and revenues forecasts, 
respectively, which are issued for the quarter t: 
                                               
9
 Because the data include several contracts for each firm in each period, I use robust standard errors clustered 
by firm to compute the p-values and test the statistical significance of the coefficients in each regression. 
10 I also used the last analyst’s earnings and revenue forecast before the earnings announcement without any 
difference in the results. 
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   Dispersioni,t = -  
                  
         
               (2) 
 I expect that the coefficients of analysts’ forecast dispersions (β13, β14, and β15) will 
be negative and significant.  
 Following the structural models of CDS valuation, I include in the model firm 
leverage (Lev), measured as the firm’s long-term debt divided by total assets at the end of 
the quarter t, the one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter (Yield), and the standard 
deviation of daily returns (StdRet) as control variables. Moreover, following the findings of 
Callen et al. (2009), I include firm size (Size), measured as the log of the total assets at the 
end of the quarter. To control for the magnitude of the equity returns, I include as a control 
variable the cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings announcement date (CAR). In 
addition, I also control for the magnitude of the analysts’ forecast surprises scaled by stock 
price (EarnSurp and RevSurp) and for CDS contract-specific characteristics. I include the 
maturity of the CDS protection (Mat), measured as the numbers of years to maturity, a 
dummy variable (Senior) set equal to 1 for senior contracts and 0 otherwise, and a dummy 
variable (Liq) set equal to 1 for semi-liquid contracts and 0 for liquid contracts.
11
 Finally, I 
control for the Standard & Poor’s short-term credit rating (Hull et al. 2004) of the 
underlying firm. I translate rating letters into numbers, with smaller numbers indicating 
better ratings.
12
 I include year dummy variables to control for time effects. I also estimate 
                                               
11 The difference between liquid and semi-liquid CDSs is in the method used to capture the premium data. 
The premia for liquid CDSs are based directly on market maker prices. The premia for semi-liquid CDSs are 
based on benchmark prices derived by comparing similar entities. 
12 Trying to control for some nonlinearities in the association between variables, I also estimate the 
coefficients of the model using rank variables instead of continuous variables. I assign all of the continuous 
variables to one of ten deciles based on the sample distribution each year. I estimate the coefficients of the 
following model:  
Rank_ CDS_Changei,t = β0+ β1 Rank_Levi,t+ β2 Rank_Sizei,t+ β3 Rank_StdReti,t+ β4Yieldt+ β5SPi,t  
+ β6 Rank_CARi,t + β7 Rank_EarnSurpi,t +β8 Rank_RevSurpi,t + β9 BeatEarni,t  
+ β10 BeatRevi,t + β11 Rank_DispersionEarni,t + β12 Rank_DispersionRevi,t+ β13Mati,t + β14Seni,t + β15Liqi,t+ εi,t 
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the coefficients of the model for three subsamples: CDS with maturities of less than one 
year, CDS contracts with maturities between 1 and 5 years and contract with maturities of 
more than 5 years. 
To test my hypothesis about the joint impact of beating or missing analysts’ 
earnings, cash flow and revenue forecasts on CDS premia levels, I construct three dummy 
variables: i) BeatEarn_BeatRevi,t, ii) MissEarn_MissRevi,t, and iii) MissEean_BeatRev. The 
dummy variable BeatEarn_BeatRevi,t (MissEarn_MissRevi,t), which represents good (bad) 
news about earnings and good (bad) news about revenues, obtains the value of 1 if the firm 
meets or beats (misses) analysts’ earnings and revenue forecasts in quarter t and takes the 
value of 0 otherwise. MissEarn_BeatRevi,t obtains the value of 1 if the firm misses analysts’ 
earnings forecasts but beats analysts’ revenues forecasts in quarter t and takes the value of 0 
otherwise. Then, I estimate the coefficients of the following model: 
CDS_Changei,t+1= β1 + β2Levi,t + β3Sizei,t + β4StdReti,t + β5Yieldt + β6SPi,t + β7 CARi,t 
                       + β8EarnSurpi,t + β9RevSurpi,t +β10BeatEarn_BeatRevi,t            (3) 
     + β11 MissEarn_MissRevi,t +β12MissEarn_BeatRevi,t +β13DispersionEarni,t  
     + β14DispersionRevi,t +β15 Mati,t+ β16 Seni,t + β17 Liqi,t  
   + β18Year_dummies +εi,t. 
I also estimate the coefficients of the model for three subsamples: CDS with 
maturities of less than one year, CDS contracts with maturities between 1 and 5 years and 
contract with maturities of more than 5 years.  
To analyze whether the effect of beating analysts’ earnings forecasts (as opposed to 
revenue forecasts) on firms’ CDS premia is more pronounced for firms with greater 
17 
 
earnings quality, I run models 1 and 3 again for two subsamples of firm-quarter 
observations: firms with higher and lower accrual quality. Based on Dechow and Dichev 
(2002), I measure accrual quality as the standard deviation of the residuals of the following 
regression
13
: 
                                
TCAit
ATit
   α0+ α1
       
    
 + α2
     
    
  + α3
       
    
 + εit,            (4) 
where 
ATit       = Firm i’s average total assets in quarter t and quarter t-1; 
TCAit = Firm i’s total current accruals in quarter t. I measure total accruals as firm’s i  
change in current asset in quarter t and quarter t-1, minus firm’s i change in current 
liabilities in quarter t and  quarter t-1, less the firm’s i change in cash in quarter t 
and quarter t-1, plus firm’s i change in debt in current liabilities in quarter t and 
quarter t-1; and 
CFOit = Firm i’s net income before extraordinary items minus total accruals in quarter t.
14
  
 I estimate equation (1) for each firm over rolling twelve-quarter windows. Using the 
regression coefficients, I estimate twelve firm- and quarter-specific residuals. I define 
accrual quality as the negative of the standard deviation of the firm-quarter estimated 
residuals: 
   Accrual Qualityit = - SD (εj time) time = t-12, t-8,…, t          (5) 
  
Larger values of Accrual Qualityit correspond to firms with higher accrual quality.
15
 
                                               
13 The results are robust for other models develop in the literature to measure earnings quality such as Francis 
et al (2005). 
14 I measure total accruals as the Total current accruals (TCA) less depreciation. 
15 An observation is classified in the high earnings quality group if the standard deviation of the residuals is 
above the median values of the distribution each year.  
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 To test whether the effect of meeting analysts’ forecasts is more pronounced for 
firms with a high risk of default, I run models 1 and 3 again for two subsamples of firm-
quarter observations based on their S&P credit rating. Specifically, I classify a firm-quarter 
observation in the “high risk of default” group if it has a credit rating of BBB- or lower at 
the end of the quarter. I expect that the effect of beating analysts’ forecasts will be stronger 
for this subsample of firms. 
3.1 Sample Selection  
 I obtain CDS price data from the Fitch CDS pricing services. These data include the 
consensus pricing for liquid CDSs based directly on market maker prices and the 
benchmark pricing for semi-liquid CDSs derived by comparing similar entities. The 
database also includes the initial maturity of the protection, its seniority (senior or 
subordinated), the currency of the underlying debt and the restructuring clause used in the 
contracts.
16
 This database includes monthly data from July 1999 to June 2002, biweekly 
data from July 2002 to May 2003 and daily data from May 2003. I also select all firms with 
at least two-quarter-ahead earnings or revenue forecasts issued by sell-side analysts from 
2002 to 2009 from the IBES database. The forecasts must be issued between 90 days before 
the earnings announcement date and the earnings announcement date. I obtain accounting 
data from the Compustat database, security returns from the CRSP database and the 
Standard and Poor’s short-term credit rating from Compustat. The final data set consists of 
56,775 observations for 480 unique firms. 
 
 
                                               
16 I consider only CDS contracts denominated in US dollars. 
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4. Descriptive Statistics  
 Table 1 shows the distribution of the observations by credit rating category and the 
mean and median CDS premium for all of the observations in each category. I translate 
ratings letters into numbers, with a smaller number indicating a better rating. As expected, 
the mean (median) CDS premium decreases monotonically from more than 1,233.1 
(1,172.2) basis points for firms with CCC+ credit ratings to 22.5 (21) basis points for firms 
with AAA+ credit ratings. Almost half of the observations correspond to contracts for firms 
with credit ratings of BBB+, BBB, BBB- and BB+. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables in my analysis.
17
 
The mean (median) CDS premium change around the earnings announcement date in the 
sample is 0.002 (-0.002), and the mean firm size is US$ 11,872 million. Table 2 shows that 
62.6% and 61.9% of the observations beat analysts’ annual earnings and revenue forecasts, 
respectively. The mean forecast errors are -0.008 and 0.003 for analyst earnings and 
revenue forecasts, respectively. Almost 42% of the observations beat the two forecasts, and 
17.4% of the observations miss earnings and revenues forecasts. The average maturity is 
7.52 years, and almost 40% of the observations correspond to semi-liquid contracts. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients. This table shows that the CDS 
premium change around the earnings announcement date is negatively related to analysts’ 
forecast dispersion and to the dummy variables denoting firms that meet or beat analysts’ 
earnings and revenues forecasts. Analysts’ earnings and revenues forecast dispersions are 
                                               
17 To remove the influence of outliers, I winsorize all continuous variables at their 1st and 99th  percentile 
levels 
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positively related to and the cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings 
announcement date are negatively related to the CDS premium change, which is consistent 
with previous research. The univariate analysis supports my hypothesis that beating 
analysts earning and/or revenues forecasts and the dispersion in such forecasts are 
negatively associated with the premium that firms have to pay to investors to bear credit 
risk.  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
5. Results 
 To test whether meeting/beating analysts’ earnings and revenues forecasts and the 
dispersion of those forecasts have an impact on firms’ CDS premia, I estimate the 
coefficients of Equation 1 and present the results in Table 4. The first column presents the 
results for the full sample, the second, third and fourth columns presents the results for 
CDS contracts at short, medium and long term maturities, respectively The variable that 
measures the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is negative and statistically significant, 
which is consistent with theories about the association between equity returns and firms’ 
probability of default previously documented in the literature (Black and Scholes, 1973 and 
Merton 1974). The variable denoting observations that beat analysts’ earnings (BeatEarn) 
or revenue (BeatRev) forecasts is negative and significant (-0.0033, p-value <0.0011, and -
0.001, p-value<0.10, respectively). Moreover, the coefficients of analyst earnings and 
revenues forecasts dispersion (DispersionEarn and DispersionRev) are negative and 
statistically significant in each model (-0.0054, p-value<0.001 and -0.022, p-value<0.001). 
These results are also economically significant; for example, a decrease of one standard 
deviation in analysts’ revenues forecast dispersion leads to a reduction on average of about 
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7.4 basis points in CDS premia. In addition, the forecast surprise coefficients (EpsSurp and 
RevSurp) are also statistically significant. These results support the first two hypotheses: 
firms that exceed analysts’ forecasts and firms with lower levels of analysts’ forecast 
dispersion enjoy smaller CDS premia when earnings are announced.
18
 In addition, the 
effect of beating analysts’ forecasts is stronger at shot maturities. The coefficients of the  
variable indicating firms that beet or meet analysts’ earnings forecasts for CDS at short 
maturities is almost the double than CDS with maturities more than 5 years (0.0025 vs. 
0.0050). 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 The results of the joint impact of beating analysts’ earnings and revenues forecasts 
on CDS premia are shown in Table 5. The first column presents the results for the full 
sample, the second, third and fourth columns presents the results for CDS contracts at short 
term, medium term and long term maturities, respectively. Considering all the observations, 
the dummy variable denoting observations that beat both analysts’ earnings and revenue 
forecasts (BeatEarn_BeatRev) is negative and significant (-0.0023, p-value<0.001), 
meaning that firms that beat both analysts’ forecasts enjoy, on average, lower CDS premia 
when firms announce their earnings numbers. However, the dummy variable denoting 
observations that miss analysts’ earnings and that beat revenue forecasts 
(MissEarn_BeatRev) is positive and significant (0.0022, p-value<0.05). Investors value 
more earnings signals when they assess the impact of beating analysts’ forecasts on the 
firms’ credit default risk. In addition, the effect of beating both analyst’ forecasts is stronger 
at short maturities. 
                                               
18 Using rank variables, I find that the estimated coefficients of Rank_EarnSurp and Rank_RevSurp are 
negative and statistically significant. Also, I find that the coefficients of Rank_DispersionEarn and Rank_ 
DispersionRev are negative and statistically significant.   
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[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 In this study, I test whether the effect of beatings analysts’ quarterly earnings 
(revenues) forecasts on a firm’s CDS is stronger for firms with higher (lower) earnings 
quality. Table 6 presents the results. As predicted, the coefficient of the dummy variable 
denoting firms that beat analysts’ earnings forecasts (BeatEarn) is negative and statistically 
significant for only the subset of observations with high accrual quality (-0.0036, p-
value<0.001). However, the dummy variables denoting firms that beat revenues forecasts 
(BeatRev) is negative and statistically significant for only the subsample of firms with low 
accrual quality (-0.0047, p-value<0.001). In addition, the accounting variables leverage 
(Lev) and firms’ size (Size) have a larger impact on firms’ CDS when earnings map more 
precisely the firms’ cash flow. Table 7 presents the effect of beating analysts’ earnings and 
revenues for firms with high and low accrual quality. Firms with low (high) earnings 
quality that miss earnings and that beat revenues forecasts have a negative (positive) 
coefficient. The results show that beating earnings (revenues) analysts’ forecasts has a 
stronger (weaker) impact on the pricing of CDS for firms with high (low) accrual quality. 
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 around here] 
 To test whether there is a stronger effect of earnings benchmark beating for high 
default risk firms (Jiang, 2008, DeFond and Zhang, 2008), I estimate models 1 and 3 for 
two subsamples of firms, with one presenting high default risk and one presenting low 
default risk. Table 8 presents the results. The effect of beating analysts’ earnings forecasts 
is almost 1.5 times larger for the group of firms with a high risk of default (-0.0043, p-
value<0.001 vs. -0.0027, p-value<0.001). Also, exceeding analysts’ revenues forecasts is 
only significant for this subsample of firms (-0.0017, p-value<0.05). Most variables based 
on accounting numbers (leverage and size) are more or only significant for the group of 
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firms with a high risk of default. Table 9 presents the effect of jointly exceeding or missing 
analysts’ earnings and revenues forecasts on the perceptions on firms’ default risk for the 
two subsamples of firms. Firms that miss the two forecasts (MissEarn_MissRev) have to 
pay a greater premium for credit risk protection only for the firms with a high credit risk 
(0.0052, p-value<0.001). The effect of exceeding analysts’ forecasts is stronger for firms 
with high risk of default. 
[Insert Tables 8 and 9 around here] 
 Overall, the results of this paper show that analysts provide important information 
that help investors to price firms’ credit default risk. Analysts’ earnings and revenues 
forecast dispersion and exceeding analysts’ earnings and revenue forecasts have an impact 
on the pricing of firms’ CDS premia around the earnings announcement date. 
6. Additional analysis 
6.1 Firms reporting losses vs. firms reporting profits 
 Losses are less informative about firms’ future prospects (Hayn 2005). 
Consequently, investors probably find revenues more informative when they assess the 
impact of accounting information in the valuation of CDS for firms reporting losses during 
the quarter. To test this idea, I estimate the coefficients of model 1 for two subsamples of 
firms based on the sign of earnings: firms reporting profits and firms reporting losses. Table 
10 presents the results. The dummy variable indicating firms that beat analysts’ earnings 
(revenues) forecasts is only significant for firms reporting profits (losses). The coefficient 
of BeatEarn is -0.0032 (p<0.001) for firms reporting profits. The same variable is not 
significant for firms reporting losses. On the other hand, the variable BeatRev is only 
significant for firms reporting losses (-0.0066, p-value,0.001) 
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[Insert Table 10 around here] 
6.2 Analysis before and after the financial crisis 
 My sample period includes the financial crisis years of 2008 and 2009. Given the 
information uncertainty relating to asset prices during this period, I expect the impact of 
beating analysts’ forecast be more pronounced during the crisis. I estimate the coefficients 
of model 1 for two subsamples of periods: before 2008 and after 2008. Table 11 presents 
the results. The coefficients of the variables denoting firms that beat analysts’ earnings and 
revenues forecasts are larger during the period after 2008 during the financial crisis  
(-0.0050, p<0.001 vs. -0.0023, p<0.001 and -0.0025, p<0.001 vs -0.0017, p<0.001, 
respectively). The same results are observed for the dispersion on analysts’ earnings and 
revenues forecasts. Accounting information seems to be more important to value firms’ 
CDS during the financial crisis.  
[Insert Table 11 around here] 
7. Conclusions 
 Previous literature has examined the impact of sell-side analysts on the equity and 
debt market. This paper has attempted to determine the impact of the information provided 
by these important market participants on investors’ perceptions of firms’ credit default 
risk. Credit default swaps (CDSs) are credit derivatives that provide a clean measure of 
firms’ credit default risk and thus allow one to test the impact of analysts’ forecast 
dispersion and the effect of beating analysts’ earnings and revenues forecasts on the pricing 
of this particular type of risk. My results indicate that firms with less dispersed quarterly 
analysts’ earnings and revenues forecasts show lower CDS premia around the earnings 
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announcement date. Moreover, firms that beat analysts’ earnings and revenue forecasts 
experience a decrease in the price that they must pay for credit default risk protection when 
preliminary earnings are announced. All of these effects are stronger for firms with high 
risk of default. The evidence in this study indicates that analyst communications, 
specifically analysts’ forecasts, play an important role in the pricing of firms’ credit default 
risk.   
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Table 1 
Sample Distribution by S&P Credit Rating Category 
 
Table 1 shows the sample distribution by S&P credit rating category. It also shows the mean and median 
values of the Credit Default Swap (CDS) premium (in basis points) for all firms in each category. 
 
S&P Credit 
Letter Rating 
S&P 
Credit 
Number N Mean_CDS Median_CDS 
AAA 1 214 22.5 21.0 
AA 3 132 28.5 16.9 
AA- 4 615 44.5 35.2 
A+ 5 1,670 45.5 36.3 
A 6 5,517 45.9 35.2 
A- 7 5,444 66.6 42.5 
BBB+ 8 7,176 84.6 50.7 
BBB 9 9,467 98.8 61.5 
BBB- 10 8,385 137.7 92.2 
BB+ 11 5,587 241.1 160.5 
BB 12 3,899 377.6 229.1 
BB- 13 2,931 503.1 311.7 
B+ 14 3,351 642.9 439.7 
B 15 1,480 1054.7 455.9 
B- 16 692 1054.7 688.0 
CCC+ 17 215 1233.1 1172.2 
  
56,775 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the following variables: CDS_changeit= the percentage change of 
the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the earnings announcement day. Levit= firm i’s 
long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Sizeit = log of firm i’s total assets at the end of 
quarter t. StdRetit= firm i’s standard deviation of daily returns during quarter t. SPit = Standard & Poor’s debt 
rating for firm i in quarter t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with smaller number indicating better 
rating. Yieldt= one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CARit= Cumulative abnormal returns around the 
earnings announcement day of quarter t. EarnSurpit= earnings surprise, computed as firm i’s actual earnings 
per share values from IBES minus the analysts’ forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. 
RevSurpit= revenues surprise, computed as firm i’s actual revenues per share values from IBES minus the 
analysts’ forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. BeatEarnit = 1 if firm i meets or beats 
the analysts’ earnings forecast consensus in quarter t. BeatRevit = 1 if firm i meets or beat the analysts’ 
revenues forecast consensus  in quarter t. BeatEarn_BeatRev = 1 if firm i meets or beats analysts’ earnings 
and revenues forecast consensus in quarter t. MissEarn_MissRev = 1 if firm i misses analysts’ earnings  and 
revenues forecast consensus in quarter t. Dispersion it = the negative value of the standard deviation of all 
analysts’ forecasts issued for firm i in quarter t. Matit = Maturity of the cds protection. Seniorit = 1 for senior 
cds, 0 otherwise. Liqit = 1 for a semi-liquid contracts, and 0 for liquid contracts. 
 
 
Q1 Mean Median Q3 Std 
CDS_change -0.022 0.002 -0.002 0.019 0.064 
Lev 0.166 0.268 0.242 0.339 0.150 
Size 8.702 9.397 9.375 10.097 0.950 
StdRet      0.014 0.025 0.019 0.028 0.017 
SP 8.000 9.499 9.000 11.000 2.728 
Yield 1.770 2.912 2.270 4.890 1.558 
CAR -0.034 0.029 -0.014 0.036 0.067 
EpsSurp -0.001 -0.008 0.002 0.005 0.162 
RevSurp -0.003 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.079 
BeatEarn 0.000 0.626 1.000 1.000 0.484 
BeatRev 0.000 0.619 1.000 1.000 0.486 
BeatEarn_BeatRev 0.000 0.419 0.000 1.000 0.493 
MissEarn_MissRev 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.000 0.379 
MissEarn_BeatRev 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.400 
Dispersion_eps 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.014 
Dispersion_rev 0.002 0.023 0.006 0.015 0.095 
Mat 2.000 7.519 5.000 10.000 7.671 
Senior 1.000 0.969 1.000 1.000 0.174 
Liq 0.000 0.402 0.000 1.000 0.490 
30 
 
Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients. Variable definitions are as follows: CDS_changeit= the percentage change of the CDS premium between one 
day before and one day after the earnings announcement day. Levit= firm i’s long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Sizeit = log of firm i’s 
total assets at the end of quarter t. StdRetit= firm i’s standard deviation of daily returns during quarter t. SPit = Standard & Poor’s debt rating for firm i in quarter 
t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with smaller number indicating better rating. Yieldt= one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CARit= Cumulative 
abnormal returns around the earnings announcement day of quarter t. BeatEarnit = 1 if firm i meets or beats the analysts’ earnings forecast consensus in quarter 
t. BeatRevit = 1 if firm i meets or beats the analysts’ revenues forecast consensus in quarter t. Dispersion it = the negative value of the standard deviation of all 
analysts’ forecasts issued for firm i in quarter t. Matit = Maturity of the cds protection. Seniorit = 1 for senior cds, 0 otherwise. Liqit = 1 for a semi-liquid 
contracts, and 0 for liquid contracts. The coefficients in bold are statistically significant at least at p<0.05.   
 
  CDS_change Lev Size StdRet SP Tbill CAR Beat_Earn Beat_Rev Disp_eps Disp_rev Senior Liq Mat 
CDS_change 1.00 0.01 -0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.06 -0.15 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 
Lev   1.00 -0.22 0.16 0.47 -0.09 0.01 -0.09 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.12 0.11 0.01 
Size   
 
1.00 -0.18 -0.46 -0.02 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.06 -0.15 0.01 
StdRet        
  
1.00 0.36 -0.53 -0.05 -0.06 -0.12 0.22 0.27 -0.11 0.04 0.06 
SP   
   
1.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.11 -0.07 0.13 0.15 -0.11 0.17 0.01 
Tbill   
    
1.00 0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.10 0.07 0.09 -0.03 
CAR   
     
1.00 0.23 0.17 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 
BeatEarn   
      
1.00 0.13 -0.08 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.01 
BeatRev   
       
1.00 -0.07 -0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
Dispersion_eps   
        
1.00 0.20 -0.01 0.01 0.02 
Dispersion_rev   
         
1.00 -0.02 0.00 0.02 
Senior   
          
1.00 -0.20 0.01 
Liq   
           
1.00 0.39 
Mat                           1.00 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Table 4 
Regression Results of the Effect of Beating Analysts’ Earnings and Revenues  
Forecasts on the CDS Premium around the Earnings Announcement Date 
 
Table 4 presents the regression results of the following model: 
 
CDS_Changei,t = β1+ β2Levi,t+ β3Sizei,t+ β4StdReti,t+ β5Yieldt+ β6SPi,t + β7 CARi,t  
  + β8EarnSurpi,t +β9RevSurpi,t + β10 BeatEarni,t + β11 BeatRevi,t + β12DispersionEarni,t  
  + β13DispersionRevi,t+ β14Mati,t + β15Seniori,t + β16Liqi,t+ β17Year_dummies +εi,t 
 
 
Where: CDS_changeit= the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the 
earnings announcement day. Levit= firm i’s long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Sizeit = log 
of firm i’s total assets at the end of quarter t. StdRetit= firm i’s standard deviation of daily returns during quarter t. 
SPit = Standard & Poor’s debt rating for firm i in quarter t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with smaller 
number indicating better rating. Yieldt= one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CARit= Cumulative abnormal 
returns around the earnings announcement day of quarter t. EarnSurpit= earnings surprise, computed as firm i’s 
actual earnings per share values from IBES minus the analysts’ forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end 
price. RevSurpit= revenues surprise, computed as firm i’s actual revenues per share values from IBES minus the 
analysts’ forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. BeatEarnit = 1 if firm i meets or beats the 
analysts’ earnings forecast consensus in quarter t. BeatRevit = 1 if firm i meets or beat the analysts’ revenues 
forecast consensus  in quarter t. Dispersion it = the negative value of the standard deviation of all analysts’ forecasts 
issued for firm i in quarter t. Matit = Maturity of the cds protection. Seniorit = 1 for senior cds, 0 otherwise. Liqit = 1 
for a semi-liquid contracts, and 0 for liquid contracts. 
 
 
Full sample 
 
Mat less than a year 
 
Mat between 1 and 5 
years 
 
Mat more than 5 years 
Variable Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   
Intercept 0.0123 1.37   
-0.0097 -0.45 
  
0.0101 0.78 
  
0.0333 2.20 ** 
Lev 0.0006 0.03   
-0.0002 -0.03 
  
-0.0001 -0.02 
  
0.0005 0.17   
Size -0.0027 -8.17 ***  
-0.0022 -2.20 ** 
 
-0.0028 -5.73 *** 
 
-0.0029 -6.45 *** 
StdRet      0.0494 2.11 **  
0.0229 0.32 
  
0.0409 1.11 
  
0.0700 2.23 ** 
Yield -0.0062 -5.41 ***  
-0.0071 -5.90 *** 
 
-0.0068 -6.19 *** 
 
-0.0051 -6.52 *** 
SP 0.0002 1.71 *  
0.0001 0.13 
  
-0.0002 -1.03 
  
-0.0003 -1.59   
CAR -0.1331 -3.45 ***  
-0.1733 -3.07 *** 
 
-0.1401 -3.87 *** 
 
-0.1090 -3.78 *** 
EarnSurp -0.0094 -3.44 ***  
-0.0137 -2.59 *** 
 
-0.0081 -1.90 
  
-0.0038 -1.32   
RevSurp -0.0069 -1.79 *  
-0.0144 -2.30 ** 
 
-0.0057 -0.89 
  
-0.0051 -1.01   
BeatEarn -0.0033 -3.59 ***  
-0.0050 -3.74 *** 
 
-0.0032 -3.68 *** 
 
-0.0025 -3.26 *** 
BeatRev -0.0011 -1.92 *  
-0.0023 -2.13 ** 
 
-0.0014 -1.80 * 
 
-0.0012 -1.98 * 
DispersionEarn -0.0054 -3.14 ***  
-0.0066 -1.85 * 
 
-0.0046 -2.79 *** 
 
-0.0045 -1.93 * 
DispersionRev -0.0220 -8.77 ***  
-0.0266 -3.45 *** 
 
-0.0222 -5.60 *** 
 
-0.0200 -6.19 *** 
Liq 0.0015 2.30 **  
0.0001 0.04 
  
0.0022 2.27 ** 
 
0.0006 0.67   
Senior -0.0066 -4.06 ***  
-0.0088 -1.86 * 
 
-0.0065 -2.66 *** 
 
-0.0059 -2.64 *** 
Mat -0.0039 -1.01               
N 56775 
   
N 10898 
  
N 22487 
  
N 23390 
 Adj_R2 0.039 
   
Adj_R2 0.048 
  
Adj_R2 0.040 
  
Adj_R2 0.035 
  
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; p-values are calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. 
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Table 5 
Regression Results of the Joint Effect of Beating Analysts’ Earnings and Revenues  
Forecasts on the CDS Premium around the Earnings Announcement Date 
Table 5 presents the regression results of the following model: 
 
CDS_Changei,t+1= β1 + β2Levi,t + β3Sizei,t + β4StdReti,t + β5Yieldt + β6SPi,t + β7 CARi,t+ β8EarnSurpi,t  
                             + β9RevSurpi,t +β10BeatEarn_BeatRevi,t + β11 MissEarn_MissRevi,t  
                             + β12MissEarn_BeatRevi,t + β13DispersionEarni,t  + β14DispersionRevi,t + β15 Mati,t+ β16 Seni,t                 
                             + β17 Liqi,t + β18Year_dummies + εi,t 
 
CDS_changeit= the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the 
earnings announcement day. Levit= firm i’s long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Sizeit = 
log of firm i’s total assets at the end of quarter t StdRetit= firm i’s standard deviation of daily returns during 
quarter t. SPit = Standard & Poor’s debt rating for firm i in quarter t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with 
smaller number indicating better rating. Yieldt= one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CARit= Cumulative 
abnormal returns around the earnings announcement day of quarter t. EarnSurpit= earnings surprise, computed 
as firm i’s actual earnings per share values from IBES minus the analysts’ forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled 
by quarter-end price. RevSurpit= revenues surprise, computed as firm i’s actual revenues per share values from 
IBES minus the analysts’ forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. BeatEarn_BeatRev = 1 if 
firm i meets or beats analysts’ earnings and revenues forecasts in quarter t. MissEarn_MissRev = 1 if firm i 
misses analysts’ earnings  and revenues forecasts in quarter t. Dispersion it = the negative value of the standard 
deviation of all analysts’ forecasts issued for firm i in quarter t. Matit = Maturity of the cds protection. Seniorit = 
1 for senior cds, 0 otherwise. Liqit = 1 for a semi-liquid contracts, and 0 for liquid contracts. 
 
 
Full sample 
 
Mat less than a year 
 
Mat between 1 and 5 
years 
 
Mat more than 5 
years 
Variable Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.0099 1.10   
 
-0.0132 -0.61     0.0078 0.61   
 
0.0313 2.07 ** 
Lev 0.0002 0.11   
 
0.0001 0.01   
 
0.0001 0.03   
 
0.0006 0.22   
Size -0.0027 -8.15 *** 
 
-0.0022 -2.19 ** 
 
-0.0028 -5.72 *** 
 
-0.0029 -6.44 *** 
Std_Ret      0.0497 2.12 ** 
 
0.0239 0.34   
 
0.0413 1.12   
 
0.0700 2.23 ** 
Yield -0.0062 -5.40 *** 
 
-0.0071 -5.88 *** 
 
-0.0068 -5.17 *** 
 
-0.0051 -5.52 *** 
SP -0.0002 -1.42   
 
0.0001 0.13   
 
-0.0002 -1.04   
 
-0.0003 -1.60   
CAR -0.1328 -3.37 *** 
 
-0.1728 -3.05 *** 
 
-0.1397 -4.82 *** 
 
-0.1088 -4.71 *** 
EarnSurp -0.0095 -3.48 *** 
 
-0.0039 -0.62   
 
-0.0082 -1.93 * 
 
-0.0139 -3.34 *** 
RevSurp -0.0073 -1.89 * 
 
-0.0150 -1.36   
 
-0.0062 -0.96   
 
-0.0053 -1.05   
BeatEarn_BeatRev -0.0023 -3.14 *** 
 
-0.0031 -3.95 *** 
 
-0.0027 -2.46 *** 
 
-0.0019 -1.01   
MissEarn_MissRev 0.0015 1.73 * 
 
0.0021 0.76   
 
0.0013 0.96   
 
0.0014 1.28   
MissEarn_BeatRev 0.0022 2.51 ** 
 
0.0048 1.76 * 
 
0.0019 1.41   
 
0.0013 1.18   
DispersionEarn -0.0053 -3.06 *** 
 
-0.0066 -3.80 *** 
 
-0.0055 -2.73 *** 
 
-0.0044 -1.90 * 
DispersionRev -0.0219 -8.75 *** 
 
-0.0266 -3.44 *** 
 
-0.0222 -5.59 *** 
 
-0.0200 -6.18 *** 
Liq 0.0015 2.31 ** 
 
0.0001 2.03 * 
 
0.0022 2.27 *** 
 
0.0006 0.68   
Senior -0.0066 -4.05 *** 
 
-0.0088 -1.87 * 
 
-0.0065 -2.66 *** 
 
-0.0059 -2.63 *** 
Mat 0.0000 -1.02                           
N 56775 
   
N 10898 
  
N 22487 
  
N 23390 
 Adj_R2 0.040 
   
Adj_R2 0.042 
  
Adj_R2 0.040 
  
Adj_R2 0.032 
 ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; p-values are calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. 
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Table 6 
Regression Results of the Effect of Beating Analysts’ Earnings and Revenues 
Forecasts on the CDS Premium around the Earnings Announcement Date for Groups Formed 
on Accrual Quality 
Table 8 presents the regression results of the following model: 
 
CDS_Changei,t = β1+ β2Levi,t+ β3Sizei,t+ β4StdReti,t+ β5Yieldt+ β6SPi,t + β7 CARi,t  
  + β8EarnSurpi,t +β9RevSurpi,t + β10 BeatEarni,t + β11 BeatRevi,t + β12DispersionEarni,t  
  + β13DispersionRevi,t+ β14Mati,t + β15Seni,t + β16Liqi,t+ β17Year_dummies + εi,t\ 
 
Where: CDS_changeit= the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the 
earnings announcement day. Levit= firm i’s long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Sizeit = log of 
firm i’s total assets at the end of quarter t. StdRetit= standard deviation of daily returns during firm i’s quarter t. SPit = 
Standard & Poor’s debt rating for firm i in quarter t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with smaller number 
indicating better rating. Yieldt= one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CARit= Cumulative abnormal returns around 
the earnings announcement day of quarter t. EarnSurpit= earnings surprise, computed as firm i’s actual earnings per 
share values from IBES minus the analysts’ forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. RevSurpit= 
revenues surprise, computed as firm i’s actual revenues per share values from IBES minus the analysts’ forecast 
consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. BeatEarnit = 1 if firm i meets or beats the analysts’ earnings forecast 
consensus in quarter t. BeatRevit = 1 if firm i meets or beat the analysts’ revenues forecast consensus  in quarter t. 
Dispersion it = the negative value of the standard deviation of all analysts’ forecasts issued for firm i in quarter t. Matit = 
Maturity of the cds protection. Seniorit = 1 for senior cds, 0 otherwise. Liqit = 1 for a semi-liquid contracts, and 0 for 
liquid contracts. 
 
 
Low Accrual 
Quality   
High Accrual 
Quality 
Variable Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.0107 0.75     0.0243 1.89 ** 
Lev 0.0076 0.24   
 
-0.0078 -0.22   
Size -0.0017 -3.24 *** 
 
-0.0023 -4.38 *** 
StdRet      0.0425 1.14   
 
0.0552 1.37   
Yield -0.0049 -8.19 *** 
 
-0.0068 -8.49 *** 
SP -0.0001 -0.70   
 
-0.0003 -1.25 ** 
CAR -0.1692 -8.05 *** 
 
-0.0879 -6.21 *** 
EarnSurp -0.0087 -2.95 *** 
 
-0.0092 -1.41   
RevSurp -0.0025 -0.60   
 
0.0336 3.33 *** 
BeatEarn -0.0003 -0.37   
 
-0.0036 -3.87 *** 
BeatRev -0.0047 -5.20 *** 
 
0.0002 0.25   
DispersionEarn -0.0095 -4.49 *** 
 
0.0342 3.42 *** 
DispersionRev -0.0226 -7.84 *** 
 
-0.0340 -5.53 *** 
Mat -0.0001 -0.93   
 
0.0001 1.43   
Liq 0.0017 1.66 * 
 
0.0005 0.47   
Senior 0.0035 1.29     -0.0142 -5.05 *** 
N 23056       23094     
Adj_R2 0.059       0.056     
 ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; p-values are calculated using robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 7 
Regression Results of the Joint Effect of Beating Analysts’ Earnings and Revenues 
Forecasts on the CDS Premium around the Earnings Announcement Date for Groups formed 
Based on Accrual Quality 
Table 9 presents the regression results of the following model: 
 
CDS_Changei,t+1= β1 + β2Levi,t + β3Sizei,t + β4StdReti,t + β5Yieldt + β6SPi,t + β7 CARi,t+ β8EarnSurpi,t  
                              + β9RevSurpi,t +β10BeatEarn_BeatRevi,t + β11 MissEarn_MissRevi,t + β12MissEarn_BeatRevi,t  
                              + β13DispersionEarni,t  + β14DispersionRevi,t + β15 Mati,t+ β16 Seni,t + β17 Liqi,t + β18Year_dummies +εi,t 
 
CDS_changeit= the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the earnings 
announcement day. Levit= firm i’s long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Sizeit = log of firm i’s 
total assets at the end of quarter t. StdRetit= standard deviation of daily returns during firm i’s quarter t. SPit = Standard 
& Poor’s debt rating for firm i in quarter t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with smaller number indicating better 
rating. Yieldt= one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CARit= Cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings 
announcement day of quarter t. EarnSurpit= earnings surprise, computed as firm i’s actual earnings per share values 
from IBES minus the analysts’ forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. RevSurpit= revenues surprise, 
computed as firm i’s actual revenues per share values from IBES minus the analysts’ forecast consensus in quarter t, 
scaled by quarter-end price. BeatEarn_BeatRev = 1 if firm i meets or beats analysts’ earnings and revenues forecasts in 
quarter t. MissEarn_MissRev = 1 if firm i misses analysts’ earnings  and revenues forecasts in quarter t. Dispersion it = 
the negative value of the standard deviation of all analysts’ forecasts issued for firm i in quarter t. Matit = Maturity of the 
cds protection. Seniorit = 1 for senior cds, 0 otherwise. Liqit = 1 for a semi-liquid contracts, and 0 for liquid contracts. 
 
 
Low Accrual Quality   
High Accrual 
Quality 
Variable Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.0111 0.78     0.0240 1.86 ** 
Lev 0.0011 0.34   
 
-0.0002 -0.05   
Size -0.0017 -3.23 *** 
 
-0.0022 -4.25 *** 
StdRet      0.0419 1.12   
 
0.0613 1.53   
Yield -0.0049 -8.16 *** 
 
-0.0068 -10.44 *** 
SP -0.0001 -0.75   
 
-0.0003 -1.28   
CAR -0.1684 -7.84 *** 
 
-0.0891 -7.35 *** 
EarnSurp -0.0088 -3.00 *** 
 
-0.0080 -1.24   
RevSurp -0.0028 -0.67   
 
0.0347 3.43 *** 
BeatEarn_BeatRev -0.0059 -4.98 *** 
 
-0.0039 -3.46 *** 
MissEarn_MissRev -0.0013 -0.95   
 
0.0032 2.27 *** 
MissEarn_BeatRev -0.0044 -3.20 *** 
 
0.0042 2.97 *** 
DispersionEarn -0.0092 -4.34 *** 
 
0.0302 3.02 *** 
DispersionRev -0.0226 -7.80 *** 
 
-0.0346 -5.64 *** 
Liq 0.0016 1.65 * 
 
0.0005 0.49   
Mat -0.0001 -0.94   
 
0.0001 1.44   
Senior 0.0035 1.30     -0.0143 -5.08 *** 
N 23053       23094     
Adj_R2 0.060       0.059     
 ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; p-values are calculated using robust standard 
errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 8 
The effect of Analysts’ Expectations and the Dispersion of Analysts’ Forecasts  
on the CDS Premium for Groups formed Based on Credit Risk  
Table 6 presents the regression results of the following model: 
 
CDS_Changei,t = β1+ β2Levi,t+ β3Sizei,t+ β4StdReti,t+ β5Yieldt+ β6SPi,t + β7 CARi,t  
  + β8EarnSurpi,t +β9RevSurpi,t + β10 BeatEarni,t + β11 BeatRevi,t + β12DispersionEarni,t  
  + β13DispersionRevi,t+ β14Mati,t + β15Seni,t + β16Liqi,t+ β17Year_dummies +εi,t 
 
Where: CDS_Changeit= the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the 
earnings announcement day. Levit= firm i’s long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Sizeit = log 
of firm i’s total assets at the end of quarter t. StdRetit= firm i’s standard deviation of daily returns during quarter t. 
SPit = Standard & Poor’s debt rating for firm i in quarter t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with smaller 
number indicating better rating. Yieldt= one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CARit= Cumulative abnormal 
returns around the earnings announcement day of quarter t. EarnSurpit= earnings surprise, computed as firm i’s 
actual earnings per share values from IBES minus the analysts’ forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end 
price. RevSurpit= revenues surprise, computed as firm i’s actual revenues per share values from IBES minus the 
analysts’ forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. BeatEarnit = 1 if firm i meets or beats the 
analysts’ earnings forecast consensus in quarter t. BeatRevit = 1 if firm i meets or beat the analysts’ revenues 
forecast consensus  in quarter t. Dispersion it = the negative value of the standard deviation of all analysts’ forecasts 
issued for firm i in quarter t. Matit = Maturity of the cds protection. Seniorit = 1 for senior cds, 0 otherwise. Liqit = 1 
for a semi-liquid contracts, and 0 for liquid contracts. 
 
 
 
Low Default risk   High Default risk 
Variable Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -0.0062 -0.52     0.0553 4.00 *** 
Lev -0.0025 -0.66   
 
-0.0041 -1.74 * 
Size -0.0009 -2.07 ** 
 
-0.0058 -6.69 *** 
StdRet      -0.0553 -1.49   
 
0.0875 2.95 *** 
Yield -0.0080 -3.98 *** 
 
-0.0046 -8.42 *** 
CAR -0.1164 -5.89 *** 
 
-0.1368 -4.96 *** 
EarnSurp 0.0546 0.92   
 
-0.0079 -2.88 *** 
RevSurp -0.0514 -6.65 *** 
 
0.0043 1.09   
BeatEarn -0.0027 -3.02 *** 
 
-0.0047 -5.63 *** 
BeatRev 0.0000 0.03   
 
-0.0017 -2.03 ** 
DispersionEarn -0.0045 -2.55 ** 
 
-0.0050 -1.78 * 
DispersionRev -0.0804 -8.95 *** 
 
-0.0162 -6.52 *** 
Mat 0.0001 1.12   
 
-0.0001 -2.10 ** 
Liq -0.0142 -3.54 *** 
 
-0.0041 -2.25 ** 
Senior -0.0007 -0.77     0.0027 3.02 *** 
N 30235       26540     
Adj_R2 0.035       0.055     
  ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; p-values are calculated using   
  robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 9 
Regression Results of the Joint Effect of Beating Analysts’ Earnings and Revenues  
Forecasts on the CDS Premium around the Earnings Announcement Date for Groups 
formed Based on Credit Risk 
Table 7 presents the regression results of the following model: 
 
CDS_Changei,t+1= β1 + β2Levi,t + β3Sizei,t + β4StdReti,t + β5Yieldt + β6SPi,t + β7 CARi,t+ β8EarnSurpi,t  
                              + β9RevSurpi,t +β10BeatEarn_BeatRevi,t + β11 MissEarn_MissRevi,t + β12MissEarn_BeatRevi,t  
                              + β13DispersionEarni,t +β14DispersionRevi,t +β15 Mati,t+β16 Seni,t + β17 Liqi,t+β18Year_dummies +εi,t 
 
CDS_changeit= the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the earnings 
announcement day. Levit= firm i’s long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Sizeit = log of firm 
i’s total assets at the end of quarter t. StdRetit= standard deviation of daily returns during firm i’s quarter t. SPit = 
Standard & Poor’s debt rating for firm i in quarter t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with smaller number 
indicating better rating. Yieldt= one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CARit= Cumulative abnormal returns 
around the earnings announcement day of quarter t. EarnSurpit= earnings surprise, computed as firm i’s actual 
earnings per share values from IBES minus the analysts’ forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. 
RevSurpit= revenues surprise, computed as firm i’s actual revenues per share values from IBES minus the analysts’ 
forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. BeatEarn_BeatRev = 1 if firm i meets or beats 
analysts’ earnings and revenues forecasts in quarter t. MissEarn_MissRev = 1 if firm i misses analysts’ earnings  
and revenues forecasts in quarter t. Dispersion it = the negative value of the standard deviation of all analysts’ 
forecasts issued for firm i in quarter t. Matit = Maturity of the cds protection. Seniorit = 1 for senior cds, 0 
otherwise. Liqit = 1 for a semi-liquid contracts, and 0 for liquid contracts. 
 
 
Low Default risk   High Default risk 
Variable Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -0.0081 -0.68     0.0503 3.63 *** 
Lev -0.0021 -0.55     -0.0041 -1.76 * 
Size -0.0008 -1.98 **   -0.0058 -7.69 *** 
StdRet      -0.0506 -1.37     0.0877 2.95   
Yield -0.0079 -3.90 ***   -0.0046 -8.42 *** 
CAR -0.1163 -5.89 ***   -0.1369 -4.96 *** 
EarnSurp 0.0528 0.89     -0.0079 -2.87 *** 
RevSurp -0.0516 -6.67 ***   0.0044 1.12   
BeatEarn_BeatRev -0.0026 -2.64 ***   -0.0014 -1.27   
MissEarn_MissRev -0.0016 -1.21     0.0052 4.19 *** 
MissEarn_BeatRev 0.0029 2.26 **   0.0030 2.38 ** 
DispersionEarn -0.0040 -2.20 **   -0.0050 -1.78 * 
DispersionRev -0.0811 -6.99 ***   -0.0162 -6.54 *** 
Liq -0.0008 -0.82     0.0027 3.01 *** 
Mat 0.0001 1.14     -0.0001 -2.10 ** 
Senior -0.0136 -3.39 ***   -0.0041 -2.24 ** 
N 30235       26540     
Adj_R2 0.026       0.055     
 ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; p-values are calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 10 
Regression Results of the Effect of Beating Analysts’ Earnings and Revenues  
Forecasts on the CDS Premium around the Earnings Announcement Date for firms  
Reporting Profits and Losses 
 
Table 10 presents the regression results of the following model for subsample of firms reporting profits and losses: 
 
CDS_Changei,t = β1+ β2Levi,t+ β3Sizei,t+ β4StdReti,t+ β5Yieldt+ β6SPi,t + β7 CARi,t  
  + β8EarnSurpi,t +β9RevSurpi,t + β10 BeatEarni,t + β11 BeatRevi,t + β12DispersionEarni,t  
  + β13DispersionRevi,t+ β14Mati,t + β15Seniori,t + β16Liqi,t+ β17Year_dummies +εi,t 
 
 
Where: CDS_changeit= the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the 
earnings announcement day. Levit= firm i’s long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Sizeit = log 
of firm i’s total assets at the end of quarter t. StdRetit= firm i’s standard deviation of daily returns during quarter t. 
SPit = Standard & Poor’s debt rating for firm i in quarter t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with smaller 
number indicating better rating. Yieldt= one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CARit= Cumulative abnormal 
returns around the earnings announcement day of quarter t. EarnSurpit= earnings surprise, computed as firm i’s 
actual earnings per share values from IBES minus the analysts’ forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end 
price. RevSurpit= revenues surprise, computed as firm i’s actual revenues per share values from IBES minus the 
analysts’ forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. BeatEarnit = 1 if firm i meets or beats the 
analysts’ earnings forecast consensus in quarter t. BeatRevit = 1 if firm i meets or beat the analysts’ revenues 
forecast consensus  in quarter t. Dispersion it = the negative value of the standard deviation of all analysts’ forecasts 
issued for firm i in quarter t. Matit = Maturity of the cds protection. Seniorit = 1 for senior cds, 0 otherwise. Liqit = 1 
for a semi-liquid contracts, and 0 for liquid contracts. 
 
 
Firms reporting 
profits 
 
Firms reporting 
losses 
Variable Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   
Intercept 0.0037 0.36     0.0801 4.64 *** 
Lev -0.0079 -3.36 ***   0.0253 5.81 *** 
Size -0.0016 -4.32 ***   -0.0086 -6.91 *** 
StdRet      -0.0099 -0.34 **   0.0323 0.62   
Yield -0.0067 -5.05 ***   -0.0052 -5.36 *** 
SP 0.0000 0.06     0.0018 6.35 *** 
CAR -0.1229 -3.97 ***   -0.1487 -3.79 *** 
EarnSurp -0.1395 -8.37 ***   -0.0071 -2.51 ** 
RevSurp -0.0267 -5.62 ***   0.0244 3.92 *** 
BeatEarn -0.0032 -3.33 ***   -0.0017 -1.31   
BeatRev 0.0001 0.22     -0.0066 -4.75 *** 
DispersionEarn -0.0025 -1.62 *   -0.0100 -2.47 ** 
DispersionRev -0.0208 -6.27 ***   -0.0206 -5.31 *** 
Mat 0.0000 -0.88     0.0000 -0.58   
Liq 0.0026 3.56 ***   -0.0051 -3.60 *** 
Senior -0.0092 -4.98 ***   -0.0035 -1.02   
N 47101 
   
N 9674 
 Adj_R2 0.033 
   
Adj_R2 0.088 
 ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; p-values are calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 11 
Regression Results of the Effect of Beating Analysts’ Earnings and Revenues  
Forecasts on the CDS Premium around the Earnings Announcement Date  
Before and After 2008 
 
Table 11 presents the regression results of the following model for subsample of firms before and after 2008: 
 
CDS_Changei,t = β1+ β2Levi,t+ β3Sizei,t+ β4StdReti,t+ β5Yieldt+ β6SPi,t + β7 CARi,t  
  + β8EarnSurpi,t +β9RevSurpi,t + β10 BeatEarni,t + β11 BeatRevi,t + β12DispersionEarni,t  
  + β13DispersionRevi,t+ β14Mati,t + β15Seniori,t + β16Liqi,t+ β17Year_dummies +εi,t 
 
 
Where: CDS_changeit= the percentage change of the CDS premium between one day before and one day after the 
earnings announcement day. Levit= firm i’s long term debt divided by total assets at the end of quarter t. Sizeit = log 
of firm i’s total assets at the end of quarter t. StdRetit= firm i’s standard deviation of daily returns during quarter t. 
SPit = Standard & Poor’s debt rating for firm i in quarter t. I translate ratings letters into numbers, with smaller 
number indicating better rating. Yieldt= one-year T-Bill rate at the end of quarter t. CARit= Cumulative abnormal 
returns around the earnings announcement day of quarter t. EarnSurpit= earnings surprise, computed as firm i’s 
actual earnings per share values from IBES minus the analysts’ forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end 
price. RevSurpit= revenues surprise, computed as firm i’s actual revenues per share values from IBES minus the 
analysts’ forecast consensus in quarter t, scaled by quarter-end price. BeatEarnit = 1 if firm i meets or beats the 
analysts’ earnings forecast consensus in quarter t. BeatRevit = 1 if firm i meets or beat the analysts’ revenues 
forecast consensus  in quarter t. Dispersion it = the negative value of the standard deviation of all analysts’ forecasts 
issued for firm i in quarter t. Matit = Maturity of the cds protection. Seniorit = 1 for senior cds, 0 otherwise. Liqit = 1 
for a semi-liquid contracts, and 0 for liquid contracts. 
 
Before 2008 
 
After 2008 
Variable Coeff. t-stat     Coeff. t-stat   
Intercept 0.0158 1.58     0.0574 8.36 *** 
Lev -0.0043 -1.47     0.0011 0.37   
Size -0.0023 -5.21 ***   -0.0041 -8.23 *** 
StdRet      -0.3626 -6.01 ***   0.2180 6.71 *** 
Yield -0.0079 -7.35 ***   -0.0027 -3.08 *** 
SP 0.0002 0.92     0.0004 1.69 * 
CAR -0.1753 -4.07 ***   -0.1043 -4.27 *** 
EarnSurp -0.0037 -0.89     -0.0087 -2.73 *** 
RevSurp -0.0125 -1.28     -0.0053 -1.30   
BeatEarn -0.0023 -3.04 ***   -0.0050 -5.43 *** 
BeatRev -0.0017 2.02 **   -0.0025 -2.78 *** 
DispersionEarn -0.0026 -2.41 **   -0.0065 -2.12 ** 
DispersionRev -0.0048 -2.01 **   -0.0260 -6.08 *** 
Mat 0.0000 -0.50     -0.0001 -1.41   
Liq 0.0025 2.93 **   0.0002 0.21   
Senior -0.0039 -1.36     -0.0076 -3.79 *** 
N 36948 
   
N 19827 
 Adj_R2 0.040 
   
Adj_R2 0.054 
  
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; p-values are calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. 
